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1
 Ambedkar on democracy and territory during linguistic 
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2
 
 
Short Title: Ambedkar on democracy and territory 
Oliver Godsmark 
University of Sheffield 
o.godsmark@sheffield.ac.uk 
 
Abstract 
 
This article considers AmbedkarÕs ideas about the implementation of democracy in India, in the 
context of the linguistic reorganisation of provincial administrative boundaries. In doing so, it looks to 
emphasise the importance of territorial configurations to Dalit politics during this period, and in 
particular the consequences of ÔprovincialisationÕ, which has received little attention within the 
existing literature. Rethinking space by redrawing administrative territory provided Ambedkar with 
one potential avenue through which to escape the strictures of DalitsÕ minority status. In this vision, 
linguistic reorganisation (and partition) were harbingers of greater democratisation and potential 
palliatives to the threat of Hindu majority rule at the centre. In turn, however, Ambedkar 
simultaneously came to perceive the creation of these new administrative spaces as marking a new 
form of provincial majoritarianism, despite his best efforts to form alliances with those making such 
demands. In this sense, the article also seeks to address some of the shared processes behind linguistic 
	
1
 The phrase, an adaptation of the infamous Ôcivis romanus sumÕ, is taken from AmbedkarÕs 
Pakistan, or the partition of India (Bombay: Thacker and Company Limited, 1946), in Babasaheb 
Ambedkar writings and speeches [henceforth BAWS], vol. VIII, (ed.) V. Moon, (New Delhi: Dr. 
Ambedkar Foundation, 2014 [1990]), p. 188. 
2
 Elements of this article were presented at the ÔRe-centring the ÒpariahÓÕ workshop at the 
University of Leeds in June 2017. The author is appreciative of the audienceÕs observations on that 
paper, as well as the critical recommendations offered by the two anonymous readers of this article. 
	
2	
reorganisation and partition, as two related forms of territorial redrawing. In the face of these 
demands, and the failures of both commensuration and coalition politics, Ambedkar turned to the idea 
of separate settlements for Dalits, whereby they might themselves come to constitute a majority. Whilst 
such a novel attempt at separation and resettlement was not ultimately realised, its emergence within 
AmbedkarÕs thought at this time points towards its significance in any history of caste and 
untouchability in twentieth-century South Asia. 
 
Introduction 
 
In October 1948, B. R. Ambedkar, the renowned Dalit politician, lawyer and thinker, 
published Maharashtra as a linguistic province.
3
 The publication of this pamphlet 
made available to wider Indian society the memorandum that Ambedkar had recently 
submitted to the Linguistic Provinces Commission. The Commission had been tasked 
by the Indian Constituent Assembly with investigating the efficacy of linguistic 
reorganisation, or the redrawing of postcolonial IndiaÕs provincial administrative 
boundaries on linguistic lines.
4
 As the title suggests, Ambedkar had taken a personal 
interest in the possible creation of Maharashtra, a province imagined by its proponents 
as capable of encompassing the approximately 27 million Marathi speakers 
predominantly residing in western India at that time. Although Maharashtra as a 
linguistic province was AmbedkarÕs first formal publication on the issue, he had been 
	
3
 B. R. Ambedkar, Maharashtra as a linguistic province: statement submitted to the Linguistic 
Provinces Commission (Bombay: Thacker and Company Limited, 1948), in BAWS, vol. I, (ed.) V. 
Moon, (2014 [1979]), pp. 99-128. 
4
 To avoid confusion throughout this article, I shall refer to sub-national units of administration 
within both colonial and postcolonial India as ÔprovincesÕ, despite the fact that the nomenclature was 
changed to ÔstatesÕ under the Indian Constitution of 1950. Where I have quoted directly from other 
works that use these phrases, I have retained the terminology used in the original. 
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engaged periodically with the question of linguistic reorganisation since at least the 
late 1920s, and would continue to propose innovative ideas for the redrawing of 
IndiaÕs administrative map until his untimely death in December 1956. As a Marathi 
speaker himself, Ambedkar envisaged the demand for Maharashtra as intersecting 
with his own particular conceptions and concerns regarding IndiaÕs nascent 
democratic order. He heralded both the idea of Maharashtra, and linguistic 
reorganisation more generally, at different times and in different contexts, as both a 
potential harbinger of and a possible threat to greater equality. In both of these 
tellings, linguistic reorganisation was deemed particularly significant to IndiaÕs Dalit 
population, who were subjected to a separate stigmatised existence outside caste 
Hindu society, but who had also begun to comprise a new political constituency under 
AmbedkarÕs leadership by the early twentieth century.
5
 
This article employs AmbedkarÕs speeches and writings on linguistic reorganisation 
as critical conduits through which to engage with his wider thinking, thereby 
providing broader and novel insights into AmbedkarÕs understandings of the workings 
of democracy during IndiaÕs post/colonial transition. In doing so, it seeks to make a 
valuable contribution to the growing field of ÔAmbedkar studiesÕ. Despite an 
impressive and constantly developing body of work, historians interested in both the 
politics and writings of Ambedkar have tended to pay little attention to his thoughts 
on linguistic reorganisation.
6
 On the other hand, some recent works by political 
	
5
 Dalit, literally meaning Ôground downÕ or Ôbroken to piecesÕ, is used as the preferred designation 
for IndiaÕs former ÔuntouchableÕ community, who are also known, in the parlance of the late 
colonial and postcolonial state, as ÔScheduled CastesÕ. I generally use Dalit as the preferred term 
throughout this article, but retain the original terms used in direct quotations. 
6
 See, for example, E. Zelliot, AmbedkarÕs world: the making of Babasaheb and the Dalit movement 
(New Delhi: Navayana Publishing, 2013 [1969]); G. Omvedt, Dalits and the democratic revolution: 
	
4	
scientists have started to contemplate the viability of AmbedkarÕs approach to such 
schemes, particularly when considering the significance of caste to contemporary 
territorial re-imaginings within India in the twenty-first century. Louise Tillin has 
explored how demands for the creation of Uttarakhand, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand 
were in part predicated on Ôchallenges to caste hierarchies and the politicisation of 
caste identities by political parties in Hindi-speaking north IndiaÉÕ.
 7
 Equally, Sudha 
Pai and Avinash Kumar have reassessed the various safeguards that Ambedkar 
envisaged might protect Dalits from the worst ravages of reorganisation and the 
associated Ôproblem of communal majoritiesÕ.
8
 Whilst these works provide germane 
insights into how caste has shaped democratic practices in the context of schemes of 
reorganisation, they are often oriented around present policymaking perspectives.
9
 
	
Dr. Ambedkar and the Dalit movement in colonial India (New Delhi: Sage, 1994); C. Jaffrelot, Dr 
Ambedkar and untouchability: analysing and fighting caste (New Delhi: Permanent Black, 2005); 
A. Rao, The caste question: Dalits and the politics of modern India (Berkeley, California: 
University of California Press, 2009), chapter three; A. Kumar, Radical equality: Ambedkar, 
Gandhi, and the risk of democracy (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2015). 
7
 L. Tillin, ÔCaste, territory and federalismÕ, Seminar, vol. 633, May 2012; see also, Tillin, 
Remapping India: new states and their political origins (London: Hurst, 2013), pp. 21-23, 44-45. 
8
 S. Pai and A. Kumar, Revisiting 1956: B. R. Ambedkar and states reorganisation (Hyderabad: 
Orient Blackswan, 2014), p. 79. See also, pp. 36-39, 60-61, 78-81, 84-85. 
9
 For example, see Pai and KumarÕs book description: ÔAnd now, as new states are being formed, 
AmbedkarÕs works find renewed relevance É Ambedkar showed remarkable vision that 
administrators can learn from. In laying criteria for reorganisation of states É he has already 
addressed concerns that the contemporary common man now asksÕ. ÔRevisiting 1956: B. R. 
Ambedkar and States ReorganisationÕ, available at 
http://www.orientblackswan.com/BookDescription?isbn=978-81-250-5514-3&t=e [accessed 15 
March 2018].	
	
5	
This article, by contrast, aims to more effectively contextualise AmbedkarÕs thinking 
on reorganisation during his lifetime, by arguing that it developed in an environment 
shaped by the process of ÔprovincialisationÕ during the late colonial period. 
Under the Government of India Acts of 1919 and 1935, introduced to assuage an 
increasingly assertive nationalist politics, legislative and bureaucratic power was 
conceded in a measured and incomplete manner to Indians at the provincial level. 
This ÔprovincialisationÕ of politics has an older, rather dated, and somewhat 
problematic scholarship, associated with the so-called ÔCambridge SchoolÕ of the 
1970s and 1980s.
10
 This article, however, looks to rehabilitate the term by employing 
it in a new and innovative manner. It avoids engaging with it to signify a politics of 
patronage undertaken by mere Ômimic menÕ divested of agency.
11
 Instead, it uses the 
term to focus more on what it can tell us about the socio-spatial impact of the 
intertwined processes of territorialisation and gradual, limited forms of 
democratisation that were under way in interwar India. In doing so, this article also 
moves beyond the prevailing emphases and imperatives of much of the existing 
historiography on Dalit politics during this period. Provincialisation, whether as a 
form of democratisation or territorialisation, has received little attention within Dalit 
studies to date. In relation to democratisation, for example, it has always been 
	
10
 J. Gallagher, G. Johnson, and A. Seal (eds), Locality, province, and nation: essays on Indian 
politics, 1870 to 1940 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973); G. Johnson, Provincial 
politics and Indian nationalism: Bombay and the Indian National Congress, 1880 to 1915, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973); C. J. Baker, The politics of South India, 1920-1937 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976); D. A. Washbrook, The emergence of provincial 
politics: the Madras Presidency, 1870-1920 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976). 
11
 T. Raychaudhuri, ÔIndian nationalism as animal politicsÕ, The Historical Journal, vol. 22, no. 3, 
1979, pp. 747-763. 
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subordinated, for obviously compelling reasons, to accounts focusing on the demand 
for separate electorates and the implications of the Poona Pact for Dalit politics. 
When considering territorialisation, meanwhile, much of the best literature has 
focused on the extent of Dalit support for partition, as well as the implications of 
partition upon Dalit politics. However, its significance is perhaps implicit in the 
works of Sekhar Bandyopadhyay and Dwaipayan Sen, who have considered the 
actions and feelings of Dalit representatives in Bengal as they contended with the 
emergence and growth of mass Muslim politics from the interwar years on.
12
 This 
article, by contrast, more explicitly highlights the impact of provincialisation in 
stimulating majoritarian impulses as part of a related process in other parts of India. 
Concentrating upon provincialisation therefore provides an alternative, original, and 
broadened angle through which to engage with Dalit politics at this time. In fact, both 
the demands for Pakistan and Samyukta (ÔunitedÕ) Maharashtra might be considered 
to emerge, at least in part, as a consequence of provincialisation during the interwar 
years. 
This article therefore looks to associate AmbedkarÕs ideas about linguistic 
reorganisation with his opinions on the demand for Pakistan, particularly within his 
	
12
 S. Bandyopadhyay, ÔFrom alienation to integration: changes in the politics of caste in Bengal, 
1937-47Õ, Indian Economic and Social History Review [henceforth IESHR], vol. 31, no. 3, 1994, pp. 
349-391; S. Bandyopadhyay, Caste, protest and identity in colonial India: the Namasudras of 
Bengal, 1872-1947 (London: Curzon Press, 1997); S. Bandyopadhyay, ÔTransfer of power and the 
crisis of Dalit politics in IndiaÕ, Modern Asian Studies [henceforth MAS], vol. 34, no. 4, 2000, pp. 
893-942; D. Sen, ÔCaste politics and partition in South Asian historyÕ, History Compass, vol. 10, no. 
7, 2012, pp. 512-522; D. Sen, ÔÒNo matter how, Jogendranath had to be defeatedÓ: the Scheduled 
Castes Federation and the making of partition in Bengal, 1945-1947Õ, IESHR, vol. 49, no. 3, 2012, 
pp. 321-364.	
	
7	
seminal work Pakistan, or the partition of India, the third revised edition of which 
was published only two years before the publication of Maharashtra as a linguistic 
province. Pai and Kumar have also begun to briefly compare AmbedkarÕs approach to 
provincial reorganisation, on the one hand, and his thoughts and theories on the 
Pakistan demand, on the other.
13
 Vasudha Bharadwaj has argued much more 
extensively that Ambedkar viewed the demands for Pakistan and Andhra Pradesh as 
analogous, particularly as they both coincided with the creation of new majority and 
minority communities as a consequence of territorial reorganisation.
14
 But by 
thinking, as a historian, about both of these developments in the context of 
provincialisation, this article moves beyond a straightforward comparison, and instead 
sees the demands for Samyukta Maharashtra and Pakistan as emerging as a 
consequence of a related process experienced across late colonial British India. Too 
often they have been treated as discrete developments, despite being contemplated 
and debated by their contemporaries conterminously. In this telling, Pakistan was just 
one example of a multitude of new spaces conceived and sometimes fashioned in the 
decades immediately prior to and after independence. Indeed, this relates favourably 
to certain recent scholarship on the idea of Pakistan, which has foregrounded how at 
least some of its proponents envisaged the possibility that, as a vision for a federal 
political future, it could be equally applicable to other communities in South Asia.
15
 
By focusing on the significance of territory and territoriality in AmbedkarÕs 
thought, this article also intersects with a wider literature on space within Dalit 
	
13
 Pai and Kumar, Revisiting 1956, pp. 39-42. 
14
 V. Bharadwaj, ÔAmbedkarÕs paradox of differentiation: language, nation and recognition of states 
in post-colonial IndiaÕ, IESHR, vol. 52, no. 1, 2015, pp. 79-108 (particularly pp. 93, 98). 
15
 N. Bose, ÔPurba Pakistan zindabad: Bengali visions of Pakistan, 1940-1947Õ, MAS, vol. 48, no. 1, 
2014, p. 8. 
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studies, whilst taking it in altogether new spatio-temporal directions. This literature 
has moved beyond the principal concerns of an older generation of anthropologists 
interested in caste and untouchability, which tended to focus upon the significance of 
occupation and the body.
16
 It has two prevailing dimensions. First, historians and 
social scientists have demonstrated the significance of the cēri, palli, vada or jati 
muhalla (caste neighbourhood) to the imposition of social boycott by caste Hindus on 
Dalits in both rural and urban settings.
17
 Yet despite the adverse role of spatial 
configurations in perpetuating caste inequality, Dalits have consistently Ôwrought the 
transformation of their villages from theatres of oppression to sites of struggleÕ.
18
 The 
second aspect of those works interested in novel questions about spatial 
configurations within Dalit studies has therefore examined how Dalits themselves 
sought access to civic space in modern India. In fact, as Ramnarayan Rawat has 
noted, jati muhallas also served as sites through which a collective Dalit political 
consciousness could be created and nurtured.
19
 This article provides a sense of how 
	
16
 R. S. Rawat, ÔOccupation, dignity, and space: the rise of Dalit StudiesÕ, History Compass, vol. 11, 
no. 12, 2013, pp. 1059-1067 (pp. 1063-1065). 
17
 J. F. Chirez-Garza, ÔTouching space: Ambedkar on the spatial features of untouchabilityÕ, 
Contemporary South Asia, vol. 22, no. 1, 2014, pp. 37-50; R. Viswanath, The Pariah problem: 
caste, religion and the social in modern India (New York, New York: Columbia University Press, 
2014), p. 31; G. Guru, ÔThe Indian nation in its egalitarian conceptionÕ, in Dalit Studies, (eds) R. S. 
Rawat and K. Satyanarayana (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2016), pp. 31-49; 
Rawat, ÔOccupation, dignity, and spaceÕ, pp. 1064-1065; see also, R. S. Rawat and K. 
Satyanarayana, ÔIntroduction: Dalit Studies: new perspectives on Indian history and societyÕ, in 
Dalit Studies, pp. 1-30 (p. 19); R. K. Hans, ÔMaking sense of Dalit Sikh historyÕ, in Dalit Studies, 
pp. 131-151 (p. 145). 
18
 Viswanath, The Pariah problem, p. 16. 
19
 Rawat, ÔOccupation, dignity, and spaceÕ, pp. 1059-1060. 
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Ambedkar engaged with space in this way, albeit by focusing on territory and 
territoriality, and by thinking through an alternative, novel scale of analysis that 
departs from the existing literature. Provincial reorganisation could be considered as a 
potential opportunity to escape the socio-spatial strictures imposed by the Hindu 
majority on Dalits, on the one hand, but also as possibly presenting new socio-spatial 
impediments to Dalit equality, on the other. 
Finally, this article can also be situated within a wider comparative frame, and 
related to a broader scholarly literature that considers the significance of questions 
about territory and democracy that emerged simultaneously in much of the rest of the 
world in the first half of the twentieth century. In this sense, the end of the British 
Empire in India was obviously only one part of a global zeitgeist towards the breaking 
up of multi-ethnic imperial spaces. Ambedkar recognised as much, ruminating at 
length on the fallout from imperialism in Europe in his tome on the Pakistan demand, 
and comparing the successes and failures of various multi-ethnic political entities with 
prevailing ideas about a possible federal Indian union.
20
 At the Paris Peace 
Conference in the aftermath of the First World War, the victors had gathered together 
to redraw the map of central, eastern and southeastern Europe, breaking up much of 
the German, Habsburg, and Ottoman empires in the process. However, despite 
persistent claims to national uniformity, the new, ÔrevivifiedÕ, or enlarged territorial 
nation-states that emerged in 1919 were Ôno less multi-ethnicÕ.
21
 In this sense, they 
	
20
 Ambedkar, Pakistan, or the partition of India, chapter IX. For more on these comparisons, see the 
conclusion to this article. 
21
 D. Diner, ÔBetween empire and nation state: outline for a European contemporary history of the 
Jews, 1750-1950Õ, in O. Bartov and E. D. Weitz (eds), Shatterzone of empires: ethnicity, identity, 
and violence in the German, Habsburg, Russian, and Ottoman borderlands (Bloomington, Indiana: 
Indiana University Press, 2013), pp. 61-79 (p. 67); cf. R. Brubaker, ÔAftermath of empire and the 
	
10	
prefigured the continuing diversity of postcolonial South AsiaÕs successor states. As 
Dan Diner has pointed out, the interwar period in central, eastern and southeastern 
Europe witnessed Ôa powerful tension between the newly introduced principle of an 
ethnically homogeneous nation state based on general suffrage, and the reality of a 
population composed of a multitude of minoritiesÕ.
22
  
This is particularly apparent with regards to CzechoslovakiaÕs First Republic, 
which was and continues to be venerated as the only functioning interwar democracy 
in central Europe, in a similar vein to how postcolonial India is often vaunted today as 
Ôthe worldÕs largest democracyÕ. In this myth of Czech democratic exceptionalism, 
Ôthe considerable history of collaboration in Czechoslovakia under Nazi rule, the 
violence accompanying the expulsion of the Germans in 1945, and the excesses of the 
Communist regime after 1945Õ are blamed on the Ôun-democratic habits and practices 
É quite literally introduced to Czech society by foreign invadersÕ.
23
 As Tara Zahra, 
Eagle Glassheim and others have pointed out, there was actually much continuity 
between the Czech nationalist policies of the interwar period and subsequent 
developments during the Second World War and after. During these years, Czech 
nationalist associations demanded the closure of German schools and attacked 
German statues as vestiges of the Habsburg era.
24
 Meanwhile, areas with a high 
	
unmixing of peoples: historical and comparative perspectivesÕ, Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 18, 
no. 2, 1995, 189-218. 
22
 Diner, ÔBetween empire and nation stateÕ, p. 68. 
23
 T. Zahra, Kidnapped souls: national indifference and the battle for children in the Bohemian 
lands (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2008), p. 110. 
24
 N. M. Wingfield, Flag wars and stone saints: how the Bohemian lands became Czech 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2007); E. Glassheim, ÔNational mythologies 
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density of German, Hungarian and Slovakian populations were subjected to land 
reforms that opened up agrarian tracts to Czech ÔcolonistsÕ.
25
 Central to all of these 
nationalist ambitions were prevailing conceptions of democracy that promoted and 
protected the collective rights and interests of the Czechs Ð whether as a minority in 
the newly acquired borderlands of the Sudeten or as a slim majority in 
Czechoslovakia as a whole.
26
 Critical here was the decision to engage with 
democratic representative ideals that invested greater worth in Ôthe will of the peopleÕ 
than in liberal individualism, and which were understood as epitomising the 
viewpoints of the dominant nationality. This article suggests a similar emphasis on the 
democratic interests of various majority communities emerged as empire came to a 
close in India. These prevailing conceptions of democracy informed analogous plans 
for territorial redrawing, and ultimately raised the spectre of similar consequences 
amongst South AsiaÕs minorities, including western IndiaÕs Dalit population. 
The rest of this article is arranged into three parts. It shuns a strictly chronological 
format in favour of highlighting distinct elements of AmbedkarÕs thinking that 
emerged, diminished, and intersected with one another throughout this period. The 
first part examines AmbedkarÕs attempts to develop alliances with other 
disadvantaged communities, such as non-Brahmans in Bombay (but also Muslims 
across India), in the context of the failure to achieve separate representation for Dalits 
after the Poona Pact. It argues that his support for linguistic reorganisation (and 
Pakistan) emerged out of such alliances, which promised to undermine the prevailing 
	
and ethnic cleansing: the expulsion of Czechoslovak Germans in 1945Õ, Central European History, 
vol. 33, no. 4, 2000, 463-475. 
25
 D. Miller, ÔColonizing the German and Hungarian border areas during the Czechoslovak land 
reform, 1918-1938Õ, Austrian History Yearbook, vol. 34, 2003, 303-319. 
26
 Zahra, Kidnapped souls, pp. 112-115. 
	
12	
political dominance of the high-caste Hindu. The second part focuses upon 
AmbedkarÕs attempts to retain DalitsÕ political distinctiveness, in recognition of the 
oft-strained relations Dalits experienced with other disadvantaged communities. It 
was in this context that the demands for Samyukta Maharashtra (and Pakistan) came 
to be perceived as potentially majoritarian in intent, and therefore as threats to Dalit 
political autonomy. The third and final section considers AmbedkarÕs demands for 
separate settlements and sites of sanctuary for Dalits in the context of the Samyukta 
Maharashtra and Pakistan demands. Separate settlements theoretically would provide 
distinctive political spaces in which Dalits might themselves constitute a communal 
majority, thereby counteracting the prevailing tendency to see them subsumed within 
larger Hindu, non-Hindu, and non-Brahman constituencies. They also reflected 
attempts by Ambedkar to turn the reality of DalitsÕ socio-spatial separation within the 
villages of rural India into a political potentiality. 
 
Ambedkar and the bahujan samaj 
 
Over the last two decades, there has been an exponential growth in literature that 
looks to capture the complexities of caste politics and lived experiences during IndiaÕs 
post/colonial transition.
27
 The majority of this work has considered the extent of Dalit 
ÔintegrationÕ into Ôthe more dominant streams of politicsÕ, such as the Congress-led 
nationalist movement, the Hindu Mahasabha, and various left-wing political 
organisations in the build up to independence.
28
 Among the prevailing foci when 
assessing integration has been an emphasis on the failings of AmbedkarÕs All-India 
	
27
 For a more complete overview of this literature, see Sen, ÔCaste politics and partitionÕ. 
28
 Bandyopadhyay, Caste, protest and identity, p. 173. 
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Scheduled Castes Federation (AISCF) in the 1946 provincial elections. Sekhar 
Bandyopadhyay cites the partyÕs organisational weaknesses and Ôthe compulsions of a 
political situation created by the transfer of power processÕ to explain this ÔcrisisÕ.
29
 
Dwaipayan Sen and Ramnarayan Rawat, on the other hand, have closely examined 
the terms and implications of the Poona Pact of 1932. In their interpretation, the 
PactÕs two-tiered electoral arrangement
30
 seriously undermined the ability of the 
AISCF to turn popular support into actual seats in 1946, thereby maintaining an in-
built advantage for the CongressÕs Dalit candidates.
31
  
Such questions of reserved representation in the legislature for Dalits, whether 
separate electorates or reserved seats, were consistently linked to issues of territory 
and demography. In the aftermath of the Poona Pact, for example, both the provincial 
government and Ambedkar agreed that the fifteen reserved seats for Scheduled Castes 
in Bombay Ôshould be so distributed as to secure the maximum amount of 
	
29
 Bandyopadhyay, ÔTransfer of powerÕ, p. 895; see also, S. Bandyopadhyay, ÔFrom alienation to 
integrationÕ, pp. 373-374; Bandyopadhyay, Caste, protest and identity, pp. 203-204. 
30
 The Poona Pact established a two-tiered electoral arrangement, with Scheduled Caste constituents 
voting for Scheduled Caste candidates in a primary election. The four Scheduled Caste candidates 
that received the most votes then went forwards into a second election involving the entire ÔGeneralÕ 
(i.e. Hindu) constituency, including Scheduled Caste voters, who voted for their favoured Scheduled 
Caste candidate out of the four remaining nominees. The vexed relations between M. K. Gandhi and 
Ambedkar that led to the Pact, including GandhiÕs Ôfast unto deathÕ, have been described in detail 
numerous times elsewhere, and hence are not examined here. 
31
 Sen, ÔÒNo matter howÓÕ, pp. 327-335; R. S. Rawat. ÔMaking claims for power: a new agenda in 
Dalit politics of Uttar Pradesh, 1946-48Õ, MAS, vol. 37, no. 3, 2003, pp. 585-612. 
	
14	
representation which may be practicable for these [scheduled] castesÕ.
32
 The district 
Scheduled Caste population was ultimately adopted as the basis of equitable 
distribution, with those districts with large Dalit populations generally being assigned 
more reserved seats.
33
 This scheme was comparable with both erstwhile and 
forthcoming calls for proportional representation for Dalits on the basis of population 
in northern India, which was demanded in relation to provincial legislatures and 
bureaucracies, as well as for the subsequent Constituent Assembly.
34
 In this instance, 
democracy was interpreted as an exercise in commensuration, in which special 
dispensation for disadvantaged and minority groups, such as separate electorates and 
proportionate representation, would best equalise their status. Nevertheless, whilst of 
the utmost significance, particularly as a potential means to challenge the political 
hegemony of the high-caste Hindu, the focus on such commensurative measures can 
potentially overshadow the simultaneous impact of other forms of democratisation 
and territorialisation upon the development of Dalit politics at this time. As Anupama 
Rao has demonstrated, Ambedkar actually developed his position on separate 
	
32
 Mumbai, Maharashtra State Archives [henceforth MSA], Government of Bombay [henceforth 
GOB], Reforms Office File 249, ÔReforms Office Note on Dr. AmbedkarÕs Scheme of 
Constituencies for the Scheduled CastesÕ, n.d. [circa May 1934]. 
33
 Ibid., B. R. Ambedkar, ÔA scheme for the assignment of seats reserved for the Scheduled Classes 
by the Poona Pact to the constituencies to be formed under the new constitutionÕ, 2 May 1934. 
34
 Bandyopadhyay, Caste, protest and identity, pp. 65, 70; C. Jangam, ÔDilemmas of Dalit agendas: 
political subjugation and self-emancipation in Telugu country, 1910-50Õ, in Dalit Studies, pp. 104-
130 (p. 116); R. S. Rawat, Reconsidering untouchability: Chamars and Dalit history in north India 
(Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2011), pp. 160-161, 173-174; D. Sen, 
ÔRepresentation, education and agrarian reform: Jogendranath Mandal and the nature of Scheduled 
Caste politics, 1937-1943Õ, MAS, vol. 48, no. 1, 2014, pp. 77-119 (p. 113); Rawat, ÔMaking claims 
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representation Ôthrough a sustained critique of the Muslim separate electorateÕ, in 
which Muslims had come to be considered IndiaÕs ÔmodalÕ political minority since 
1909: 
 
In fact, Ambedkar acknowledged that Muslims represented the principle of nationality, rather 
than political minority. They were a demographic majority in Baluchistan, Sind, Bengal, 
Punjab, and the Northwest Frontier Provinces. The territorialisation of number through the 
establishment of Muslim and Hindu majority provinces, a demand of the Muslim League 
from 1928, was a prelude for demands based on the territorialisation of nationality.
35
 
 
It was the process of ÔprovincialisationÕ during the interwar years that had proved 
critical to the emergence of these territorial demands. In this telling, democracy could 
be easily construed as majority rule, in which the democratic Ôcounting of headsÕ was 
deemed to reflect the interests and concerns of the majority community.
36
 But who 
actually constituted the ÔmajorityÕ community? And in which administrative spaces 
was this majority to be measured? Most accounts covering the emergence of 
democratic forms in South Asia associate the emergence of Ôa language of universal 
rightsÕ with Ôthe upper-caste, elite Hindu manÕ.
37
 Indeed, the creation of separate 
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electorates for Muslims and reserved seats for Scheduled Castes reinforced the idea 
that India was a principally Hindu nation, in which the ÔGeneralÕ constituencies came 
to be associated with ÔHinduÕ (including Dalit) representation. However, this did not 
exhaust all the potential pathways and contexts under which democratisation 
occurred. And it is here that we need to bring into the equation the significance of 
space, scale, and territory. As a consequence of provincialisation, in which a degree of 
political power was newly vested in the provinces, conceptions of political 
communities now frequently came to be mapped onto these particular administrative 
spaces. This was a process of territorialisation at the provincial level, which meant 
that the idea of communal majorities and minorities took on distinctive purchase at 
different scales and in separate contexts, which frequently departed from the ÔHindu 
majority, Muslim minorityÕ paradigm at the centre, and with which, of course, Dalit 
politics also had to contend. 
Across the 1930s and 1940s, Ambedkar and other Dalit politicians often adopted 
policies that emphasised coalition building amongst disadvantaged communities. The 
Round Table Conference of the 1930s, for example, offered the potential for a kind of 
ÔMinorities PactÕ politics, in which Dalits, Muslims and other minorities would come 
together to contest Congress dominance. Significantly, as Faisal Devji has previously 
noted, the minority communities Ôclaimed to represent nearly half of IndiaÕs 
population, thus reducing caste Hindus to a mere plurality rather than a majorityÕ.
38
 
This form of politics was strengthened in the period between the 1937 provincial 
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elections and the 1940 Lahore Resolution, during an era in which Ôthe [Muslim] 
League did not have the unstinting support of the Muslim majority provinces and was 
in search of alliesÕ.
39
 Despite changed circumstances after 1940, in which the League 
ultimately abandoned their claim to minority community status in favour of declaring 
that Muslims constituted a nation, Ambedkar initially came out in favour of the 
Pakistan demand, most obviously in his critical tome on the subject, Pakistan, or the 
partition of India. In Bengal, too, Sen has demonstrated the continuing efficacy of a 
strategic alliance between the League and the leading provincial AISCF politician 
Jogendranath Mandal. Sen highlights how, in May 1947, Mandal and the provincial 
AISCF launched a campaign against the spatial reconfiguration of Bengal through 
partition, which would otherwise ÔÒdecay the growing political consciousnessÓ and 
Òruthlessly crush the solidarity of the Scheduled Castes of BengalÓ É [as] Partition 
was essentially about the consolidation of caste Hindu powerÕ.
40
 Significantly, this 
campaign was simultaneous to the United Bengal proposal floated by H. S. 
Suhrawardy of the Muslim League and the Congressman Sarat Chandra Bose. In fact, 
though BoseÕs position was unrepresentative of other provincial Congressmen, most 
League politicians in Bengal were also against partition, for which there was no 
urgent need: Muslims already constituted a majority within the province. Support for 
a united Bengal formed one aspect of the alliance between Mandal and the League, 
which included the AISCFÕs participation in the LeagueÕs Direct Action Day (which, 
for the AISCF, was also known, tellingly, as ÔAnti-Poona Pact DayÕ) in August 1946, 
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MandalÕs nomination by the League to join the Interim Government as Law Minister 
in October, and ultimately Mandal taking up the role of Minister of Law and Labour 
in PakistanÕs first cabinet after independence. In SenÕs interpretation, then, the main 
political rival of the Namasudras (the largest Dalit community of east Bengal) was the 
high-caste Hindu. He cites the disadvantages of the Poona Pact of 1932 as distorting 
the extent to which Dalits were in favour of partition, as it had ensured the election of 
unrepresentative Dalit politicians (most often Congressmen). 
Gail Omvedt has also described the late 1930s and early 1940s as AmbedkarÕs 
radical phase, emerging as a consequence of the fallout from the Poona Pact.
41
 
Angered by the inadequacy of this compromise for separate Dalit political 
representation, in 1935 Ambedkar publicly proclaimed that although he had been born 
a Hindu, he would not die a Hindu.
42
 At the same time, Ambedkar was also conscious 
that, under the restrictive terms of the Pact, Dalits would have to find other means of 
acquiring separate representation that distinguished them from the Congress, an 
organisation that was portrayed as catering for the interests of the high-caste Hindu 
man. Recognising the failures of commensuration at this juncture informed his 
preparedness to ally with other disadvantaged communities to challenge the social, 
political and cultural dominance of high caste Hindu groups. In 1936 Ambedkar 
formed a new political movement, the Independent Labour Party (ILP), with the aim 
of generating a coalition of Dalits and non-Brahmans to counter the strength of the 
Congress amongst caste Hindus in Bombay. The coalition built upon an 
understanding of the shared subjugation of the Mahars (the largest Dalit caste in 
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Maharashtra, to which Ambedkar belonged) and Marathas (the largest non-Brahman 
caste in Maharashtra) that had first been identified by AmbedkarÕs ideological 
forebear in nineteenth-century Maharashtra, the low-caste leader Jotirao Phule. 
Traditionally, this grouping had coalesced around the idea of the bahujan samaj 
(significantly, the Ôpeople in the majorityÕ), in contradistinction to what were 
perceived to be foreign and unrepresentative Brahman and Gujarati elites. Phule, for 
example, drew upon and inverted the narrative of the ancient Aryan invasion myth as 
compelling evidence of BrahmanÕs foreign identity in western India, particularly 
when compared with all non-Brahmans (including Dalits) as the original Ôsons of the 
soilÕ.
43
 Equally, there existed a long tradition of anti-Gujarati sentiment in 
Maharashtra, stretching at least as far back as the Deccan Riots of 1875. During these 
riots, Gujarati moneylenders had been targeted and attacked by Marathi-speaking 
cultivators for refusing to provide credit needed to pay the latest instalments of the 
land tax.
44
 Much of the rhetoric inciting the cultivating classes to violence at this time 
was framed around the status of the Gujarati moneylenders as aliens and outsiders.
45
 
Significantly, this negative portrayal of Gujarati speakers in Bombay would re-
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emerge over sixty years later in the context of provincial democratic equations and the 
formation of AmbedkarÕs ILP. 
Before the First World War, the Congress Party in Bombay was also perceived by 
non-Brahmans to epitomise such high-caste elitism, and was frequently characterised 
as exclusively articulating the concerns of Western-educated urban Maharashtrian 
Brahmans. However, within a couple of decades, many Marathas had been 
incorporated into the Congress, indicative of a notable shift in opinion. There were a 
number of reasons behind changing non-Brahman perceptions of the Congress in 
western India. They owed something to the partyÕs attempts to reposition itself as a 
more representative and accountable organisation under Gandhi, as well as the 
adoption of socially ameliorative rhetoric by both Gandhians and the Congress Left. 
But growing non-Brahman support for the Congress was equally related to the 
diminishing significance of Maharashtrian Brahmans within the party in both Bombay 
and nationally, and the increasing recognition amongst elite members of non-
Brahman castes, particularly the Marathas, that joining a well-oiled political machine 
now provided the best opportunities to access power under provincialisation.
46
 As a 
result, many abandoned the erstwhile Non-Brahman Party (which had first been 
established to work the 1919 reforms and contest provincial elections) and chose to 
vote for and/or join the Congress. It was in this context, influenced by both the fallout 
from the Poona Pact and growing non-Brahman support for the Congress, that 
Ambedkar formed the ILP. 
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One of the main strategies employed by Ambedkar and the ILP, in an effort to 
wean non-Brahman support away from the Congress, was to focus on the oft-
exploitative relationships that existed between employer and employee, factory owner 
and worker, landlord and tenant, and creditor and debtor, in which the Congress was 
characterised as representing the interests of the former. In the new provincial 
legislature elected in 1937, for example, Ambedkar attempted to introduce a bill to 
abolish the khoti system.
47
 Khoti was a pernicious form of revenue extraction exacted 
upon Kunbi/Maratha and Mahar tenants in the Kolaba and Ratnagiri Districts, by the 
high-caste khots (landlords), many of whom were important local Congress leaders. 
Indeed, only the previous year, a specially appointed Maharashtra Congress Peasant 
Enquiry Committee had pledged only that khoti would be brought under a uniform 
system of control, rather than advocating its total abolition.
48
 AmbedkarÕs bill, then, 
clearly distinguished the more radical and transformative ILP policy from that 
adopted by the provincial Congress organisation. It also helped that, on numerous 
occasions, these class-based distinctions could also be framed around discrete 
regional identities. In a speech at Islampur in April 1938, Ambedkar pressed the non-
Brahman Marathas of Bombay to join the ILP rather than the Congress by invoking 
the shared hostility of non-Brahmans and Dalits towards the Gujarati shetji (trader): 
ÔThe Marwaris and Gujaratis, extorting exorbitant interest and extracting money from 
you by dishonestly taking your thumb impressions Ð all such people are to be found in 
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the Congress ranksÕ.
49
 AmbedkarÕs sense of indignation at such everyday extraction 
was magnified still further when voicing claims regarding government spending at the 
provincial level: ÔAt present the Gujaratis are ruling over us. Out of the three crores of 
rupees received from the Government of India [by the Government of Bombay], 
nearly two crores were spent on Gujarat the richest of the three divisions of the 
Province of BombayÕ.
50
  The tactic of raising regional sentiment was perhaps at its 
most apparent in the way in which Ambedkar and the ILP portrayed an incident that 
occurred in the princely state of Baroda in January 1939. 
The majority of BarodaÕs inhabitants were Gujarati speakers, but the Gaekwads, a 
martial Maratha family from the Deccan, had established a polity and ruling dynasty 
in the region during the eighteenth century. After the Second Anglo-Maratha War 
(1803-05), Baroda was forced to sign an agreement with the East India Company that 
meant it became a princely state under overarching British jurisdiction. If we fast-
forward to the late 1930s, a Congress-backed campaign for responsible government in 
this princely state had been gaining ground, leading to the creation of the Baroda 
Praja Mandal (PeopleÕs Conference). In part, this was framed around a majoritarian 
sense of regional belonging, in which it was envisaged that the establishment of 
democratic rule in Baroda would coincide with the coming to power of the majority 
Gujarati population. The Mandal, for example, had only recently accused the 
Gaekwad of primarily staffing his bureaucracy with Ôa very high and disproportionate 
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percentage of outsiders and MaharashtriansÕ.
51
 It was in this context that the 
prominent Congressman Vallabhbhai Patel, himself a Gujarati, had conducted a three-
day visit to Baroda at the invitation of the Praja Mandal, during which it was 
contended that both he and others had made inflammatory speeches about the 
Gaekwad in particular and Maharashtrians in general. Possibly as a result of these 
speeches, a number of disturbances had occurred in the state, resulting in the death of 
a Maratha boy, Kumar Jayasingh Surve.
52
 In a series of public meetings held in 
Kolaba District over the next few weeks, representatives of the ILP made consistent 
reference to these events in Baroda, claiming that Patel was responsible for SurveÕs 
ÔmurderÕ, and maintaining that Patel had instigated Ôa fight between the Gujarathis 
and the MaharashtriansÕ by stating ÔGujarath is for the GujarathisÕ. Some members of 
the ILP even went so far as to boldly assert that, ÔIf the Maharashtrians are murdered 
like this in Gujarath the Gujarathis will be murdered hereÕ.
53
 
Ambedkar and the ILPÕs appeals to a regional Marathi identity in the context of 
provincialisation have been entirely overlooked in the literature on Ambedkar and 
Dalit politics to date. Yet, as an attempt to encourage the formation of a political 
coalition that overcame caste distinctions between Dalits and non-Brahmans, it can be 
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perceived as an example of a common strategy amongst disadvantaged communities 
in much of late colonial southern and western India. In both Bombay and Madras, 
challenger elites from non-Brahman castes made reference to regional symbols Ð 
whether Dravidian, Kannada, Malayali, Marathi, Tamil or Telugu Ð to challenge the 
ÔforeignnessÕ and ÔothernessÕ of existing elites. Prerna Singh has recently argued that 
Ôthe shared solidarity that emerges from a collective identification can generate a 
politics of common goodÕ, in which Ôelites bound by such solidaristic ties are more 
likely to push for progressive social policies that further the welfare of the subnational 
community as a wholeÕ.
54
 It is as a consequence of such solidarities, Singh suggests, 
that the states of Kerala and Tamil Nadu have Ôdevoted substantial budgetary 
resources to welfare provisionÕ and Ôenjoy a far better level of social development 
than their counterparts in most other parts of IndiaÕ.
55
 There is a tendency in SinghÕs 
account to downplay recurring tensions within the Dravidian, Tamil and Keralan 
movements on the basis of caste and class, as well as nagging questions over the 
applicability of SinghÕs formula to other parts of South Asia that also experienced 
vocal subnational movements during the post/colonial transition. Yet this is not to 
dismiss the efficacy of much of her work. We can trace viable evidence of her thesis 
in the position adopted by Ambedkar at this critical juncture in his political career. 
During this period, Ambedkar also looked to soften caste tensions and divisions 
within the bahujan samaj, and as his reference to the skewed nature of government 
spending suggests, this could be reoriented around satisfying a larger regional 
common good (albeit exclusive of Brahmans and Gujaratis as ÔoutsidersÕ). Equally, 
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SinghÕs ideas about subnationalism are of great utility not only for thinking about 
variations in social development and standards of living within national boundaries, 
but can also help us better analyse AmbedkarÕs understanding of the workings of 
democracy in the provinces during this period. 
We can see, for example, in AmbedkarÕs references to regional identification and 
the ÔothernessÕ of the Gujarati, an attempt to forge a political coalition along class 
lines. Ambedkar was keen here to foster a shared solidarity, a perception of common 
neglect and abandonment at the hands of government and high-caste/Gujarati 
politicians, and a sense of the collective needs and goals of Maharashtrian workers 
and peasants, which would be capable of overriding the differences that otherwise 
existed between non-Brahmans and Dalits. If successfully orchestrated, this coalition 
could potentially make all the difference to the likelihood of ILP Dalit candidates 
being elected in seats reserved for Scheduled Castes under the Poona Pact. But it also 
promised much more: together, Dalits and non-Brahmans would be capable not only 
of toppling the political hegemony of Brahmans in Marathi-speaking districts, but 
also challenging the perceived dominance of Gujarati Congressmen within BombayÕs 
provincial politics as a whole. If enough non-Brahmans joined the ILP, the party 
could also contest unreserved seats within the general electorate, relying on their 
numbers within Marathi-speaking constituencies rather than any form of 
commensurative logic. Ambedkar, of course, continued to consistently support efforts 
to protect Dalits through reserved seats and the demand for separate electorates during 
the 1930s. But this was only one component of a variety of strategies he employed: in 
this particular instance, he not only looked to split the caste Hindu vote by drawing 
non-Brahmans away from the Congress, but also sought the reinvigoration of a non-
Brahman and Dalit coalition, in which Dalits would constitute part of the political 
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majority in Marathi-speaking districts of Bombay. In the context of provincialisation, 
Ambedkar and the ILP looked to appeal beyond the limited framework of Dalit 
politics after the Poona Pact, in tacit recognition that their representation would be 
best achieved through a broad-based movement. After the failure to achieve separate 
electorates, and in anticipation that the working of democracy in the province would 
most likely take on a majoritarian form, Ambedkar and the ILP attempted to modify 
the conception of provincial majoritarianism, reorienting it around a regional low-
caste and working-class alliance. Focusing on his references to regional identification 
and assertion provides a more holistic understanding of Dalit politics during this 
period. 
AmbedkarÕs regional concerns and imperatives in the context of democratisation 
are also apparent if we look back at his involvement in the Bombay Provincial 
Committee in 1928. The Committee was created to consult with the Simon 
Commission on constitutional reform, and to make recommendations based upon their 
particular knowledge of the province. Ambedkar, however, found a number of the 
recommendations made by the Committee objectionable, and submitted a minute of 
dissent to accompany the CommitteeÕs report. In his minute, Ambedkar raised 
concerns about the issue of apportionment, i.e. Ôthe question of distribution of seats 
among the different constituenciesÕ within the provincial legislature. ÔOne unpleasant 
feature of the [Bombay Legislative] Council as now constitutedÕ, Ambedkar argued, 
Ôis the over-representation of some part and an under-representation of the restÕ.
56
 
Significantly, Ambedkar here equated the administrative divisions of Bombay with 
region and language. If seats were to be accorded on the basis of either population 
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ratios in the province or revenue generated by each constituent part, he submitted that 
Gujarat was currently overrepresented, whilst Karnatak and Maharashtra were not 
accorded enough seats. Ambedkar therefore contended that the allocation of seats to 
respective administrative divisions accorded Gujarat a greater number of 
representatives in relation to voters than the rest of the province, in what political 
scientists now call malapportionment. Rather than privileging the equality of 
individuals, the colonial state in this instance had sought to go some way towards 
equalising linguistic groups, replicating its policy towards Hindu and Muslim 
representation at the all-India level. Ambedkar, however, argued that such a system 
was an abject failure of democracy: ÔFor, in a system in which the value of a vote is 
high in one constituency and low in another, it is open to objection that every member 
of the community has not an equal share with each of the rest of the people in the 
choice of their rulersÕ.
57
 Such logic is notable for its contrast with that which informed 
the simultaneous demand for Dalit separate electorates. 
Ambedkar went on to frame his ÔgrievanceÕ with what we term malapportionment 
in the context of the constitutional reforms of the interwar years, noting that protests 
were Ôbound to increase as the responsible character of the Legislative Council 
increases and with it the influence which it will exercise upon the conduct of public 
affairsÕ.
58
  In one way, AmbedkarÕs concerns over the distribution of seats might be 
perceived as an attempt to establish an impartial system on the basis of individual 
voter equivalence. Indeed, Ambedkar pressed for an end to restrictive property 
qualifications for the electorate over three decades, before the eventual inauguration 
of a universal franchise in an independent India. But we might also see the reforms as 
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an opportunity to reconfigure power relations in the interests of the low-caste, 
Marathi-speaking groups in Bombay, and at the expense of the Gujarati Bania and the 
Brahman, particularly given the later trajectory of AmbedkarÕs politics during the 
1930s and 1940s. In this interpretation, Ôone-person, one-voteÕ assumptions actually 
privileged the community within the province with the greatest demographic strength. 
Such realignments emphasised the significance of community and number to control 
over administrative territory in the context of provincialisation, and might be 
conceived as an early harbinger of the demand for Samyukta Maharashtra that had 
emerged by the 1940s. For certain imagined groupings and communities, provincial 
reorganisation became a tool through which to grasp political power, by recalibrating 
the provinceÕs religious, caste or linguistic demographics to facilitate certain kinds of 
majority rule. A similar logic also informed several imaginings of the Pakistan 
demand. 
For Ambedkar, linguistic reorganisation could be a future portent of enhanced 
democratic governance. During Maharashtra as a linguistic province, he claimed that 
only the redrawing of boundaries would create the level of cultural uniformity 
necessary for the effective operation of democracy within the provinces. ÔIn a 
heterogeneous populationÕ, on the other hand, ÔÉ the working of democracy is bound 
to give rise to cases of discrimination, neglect, partiality, suppression of the interests 
of one group at the hands of another group which happens to capture political 
powerÕ.
59
 In making this point, Ambedkar adopted a similar logic to that which had 
informed his support for Pakistan, where he had speculated on the potential dangers to 
the Indian Union if Muslims had been forced to remain a part of it. He raised a similar 
spectre if demands for linguistic reorganisation were consistently rebuffed: ÔThe 
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demand for Linguistic Provinces is an explosive force É It is better not to allow it to 
get too hot when it may become difficult to prevent an explosionÕ.
60
 His 
understanding of democracy here was also linked closely to both territory and 
demographics, which in turn, he contended, helped to foster a sense of ÔnationalityÕ 
within the provincial units. Following partition, Ambedkar distinguished between 
nationality Ôin its legal and political senseÕ and Ôin the social sense of the termÕ. With 
regards to the former, he argued linguistic provinces could not Ôhave that attribute of 
sovereignty which independent nations haveÕ.
61
 However, he otherwise mostly 
recognised that ÔÉ the Provinces have all the elements of a distinct nationality and 
they should be allowed the freedom to grow to their fullest in nationhoodÕ.
62
 Just like 
the demand for Pakistan, effective democratic governance was best achieved by 
substituting community for nation. 
Ambedkar thus framed the demand for Samyukta Maharashtra as a viable means 
through which to escape the strictures of suppression by another community. In the 
context of the grievances behind the Pakistan demand, he had previously surmised: 
ÔÉ constitutional safeguards have failed to save [Muslims] from the tyranny of the 
Hindu majorityÕ.
63
 Yet the ÔdominantÕ Gujarati-speaking community did not 
constitute a majority of BombayÕs provincial population. In Maharashtra as a 
linguistic province, therefore, Ambedkar employed a semantic sleight to encompass 
Gujarati speakers within the same logic: 
 
	
60
 Ibid., p. 104. 
61
 Ibid., p. 124. 
62
 Ibid., p. 101. 
63
 Ambedkar, Pakistan, or the partition of India, p. 42. 
	
30	
A meeting was held in Bombay in the building of the Indian Merchants Chamber. The 
meeting was attended by no more than sixty. With the exception of one Indian-Christian it 
was attended by only Gujarathi-speaking merchants and industrialists. Although it was small 
and sectional meeting, its proceedings were flashed on the front page of every important 
newspaper in India and the Times of India was so impressed by its importance that it wrote an 
editorial which É supported the resolution passed at the meeting regarding the future of 
Bombay. This proves what truth there is in the reply given by Lord Birkenhead to the Irish 
Leader, Mr. Redmond, in the course of the Irish controversy when he said that there are cases 
where a minority is a majority.
64
 
 
Those at the meeting had endorsed a resolution that rejected the idea that Bombay 
City should be included in Maharashtra. For Ambedkar, this showcased the tyranny of 
Gujarati-speaking traders and industrialists in the city, who sought to argue for the 
Ômonopoly of trade and industryÕ, in which Ôthe owners may rule the workers but the 
workers must not be allowed to rule the ownersÕ.
65
 Whilst he accepted the point that 
Gujaratis monopolised trade and industry in Bombay City, he rejected the idea that 
the wealth of Bombay had been built solely on their endeavour. Instead, Ambedkar 
pointed to the role of Maharashtrians Ôin supplying labour for the building up of the 
trade and industry of Bombay É It would be difficult for any economist with any 
reputation to save who could deny that labour has as much claim on the wealth 
produced as capital if not moreÕ.
66
 He thus campaigned for Bombay City to be 
incorporated in a Marathi-speaking province by referring to the mutual interests of 
Maharashtrian labour. Equally, Ambedkar maintained, these commonalities were 
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arranged on the basis of antagonism towards the entrenched power of Gujarati-
speaking capitalists. 
Such passages referencing labour and capital throughout Maharashtra as a 
linguistic province evoke the 1930s and Ambedkar and the ILPÕs Ôradical phaseÕ 
outlined in the previous section of this article. Most accounts of Dalit politics suggest 
such radicalism came to an end as a consequence of AmbedkarÕs incorporation within 
the executive as IndiaÕs first Law Minister in August 1947.
67
 Yet his position on 
linguistic reorganisation at this time suggests an alternative or more ambivalent 
trajectory that is also worthy of further consideration. In fact, although he made 
reference to the constitutional safeguards that he himself was in the process of helping 
to create, he raised these protections to question the concerns of the Gujarati minority 
that they would be potentially victimised in any future Maharashtrian province: ÔThe 
[draft] constitution of India has noted the possibility of discrimination being made 
against a minority and has made more than ample provision for preventing itÕ.
68
 The 
proposed fundamental rights of each and every citizen, the specific provisions against 
discrimination, and the role of the High Courts in issuing writs to individuals and 
governments accused of harming or harassing any minority, then, were considered as 
more than capable of protecting Gujarati speakersÕ interests. At this moment, we can 
see Ambedkar was still trying to forge a broad-based coalition of Dalits and non-
Brahmans in Bombay/Maharashtra, in recognition that democracy in India would 
most likely be majoritarian in character. Separate representation, meanwhile, was 
ultimately considered by itself incapable of alleviating the emergence of such 
democratic forms. 
	
67
 Bandyopadhyay, ÔTransfer of powerÕ, p. 936. 
68
 Ambedkar, Maharashtra as a linguistic province, p. 120. 
	
32	
 
Provincialisation, linguistic reorganisation, and majoritarianism 
 
Despite his suggestions that partition and linguistic reorganisation might serve as 
tools to both escape caste Hindu dominance and introduce effective democratic 
governance, AmbedkarÕs support for the redrawing of administrative boundaries had 
always been somewhat ambivalent. Whilst recognising the potential of prospective 
alliances with representatives of other disadvantaged communities, both Muslim and 
non-Brahman, Ambedkar had continued to encourage a vision of Dalits as a 
distinctive political minority by focusing on their particularly stigmatised and 
deprived existence. In doing so, he expressed concern about the potential impact of 
reorganisation upon Dalit representation and minority community assertion. In fact, 
provincialisation, and the calls for reorganisation that emerged in its wake, soon 
raised the spectre of new forms of majoritarianism at the provincial level, in which 
Muslims and non-Brahmans could now constitute the majority of the provincial 
population. Unlike Muslims in Sind, or non-Brahmans in Maharashtra and Karnataka, 
Dalits were a territorially dispersed minority that nowhere constituted a majority of 
the population in Bombay. This position was replicated beyond Bombay, where other 
numerically preponderate caste and religious groups, such as Muslims in Bengal and 
Punjab and non-Brahmans in Madras, were to ultimately benefit from a democratising 
system of government that still privileged community as the basis of representation. 
We can trace these concerns in AmbedkarÕs thought right back to his earliest 
engagements with the idea of provincial reorganisation. In 1928 he rejected the 
demand for the separation of Sind from Bombay on the basis that it failed to enthuse 
all Sindhi speakers and only represented the ÔsectionalÕ views of the majority Muslim 
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community, whilst Ôthe Hindus of SindhÕ were Ôarray[ed] É in opposition to itÕ.
69
 To 
back up this assertion, he made reference to the Delhi Muslim Proposals of March 
1927, which had emerged as a consequence of a meeting of thirty prominent Muslim 
politicians under the chairmanship of Muhammad Ali Jinnah. The proposals entailed 
the creation of the Muslim-majority province of Sind, provincial status for the 
Muslim-majority areas of Baluchistan and the Northwest Frontier (which were ruled 
directly by the British at the centre under a Chief Commissionership at the time), 
proportional representation in the Muslim-majority provinces of Punjab and Bengal, 
and the reservation of a third of seats in the central legislature for Muslims. In return, 
the Muslim members agreed to give up separate electorates, which Muslims had first 
received in 1909.
70
 For its proponents, the creation of five Muslim-majority provinces 
with Hindu minorities in the northeast and northwest was considered to provide 
security against the maltreatment of Muslim minorities by the Hindu majority 
elsewhere. But for Ambedkar, it was highly problematic: ÔIt is a system of protection 
by counterblast against blast, terror against terror and eventually tyranny against 
tyrannyÕ.
71
 It had the ÔdreadfulÕ and ÔfrightfulÕ effect of treating minorities Ôas 
hostages rather than citizens, whose rights are subject to forfeiture, not for any bad 
behaviour chargeable to them but as a corrective for the bad behaviour of their 
kindred elsewhereÕ.
72
 He repeated these criticisms almost two decades later, in the 
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context of the collapse of Minority Pact politics, in Pakistan, or the partition of 
India.
73
 The demand also had further sinister implications for other minorities 
residing in what would become Muslim majority provinces. It is noteworthy that 
Ambedkar began to refer not only to Hindu Raj, but also to ÔMuslim RajÕ, and more 
generally to both Ôcommunal RajÕ and Ôthe Raj of the majority communityÕ by the mid 
1940s.
74
 
In Bengal, provincialisation had provided new avenues for the Muslim majority 
population in the province to challenge the political power of the bhadralok (the 
educated and socially ÔrespectableÕ upper-caste Hindu middle classes). The rise of an 
increasingly assertive Muslim politics emerged originally in relation to the peasant 
mobilisation initiated by the Krishak Praja Party during the 1930s, but was later 
subsumed by the Muslim League as a consequence of the Lahore Resolution and the 
Pakistan demand.
75
 Muslim political consciousness in Bengal also coincided with an 
upturn in communal violence between Muslim peasants and other agricultural groups, 
such as the Namasudras, a Dalit community primarily residing in east Bengal. 
Although the violence was most often over economic and land-based issues, it was 
frequently given a communal colouring by interested political parties, colonial 
authorities, and the local and provincial press. As a result, Bandyopadhyay argues, in 
contrast to Sen, such circumstances helped foment increased Dalit anxiety about the 
potential for Muslim political domination in a Muslim majority province after 
independence. It is in this context that Bandyopadhyay suggests many Namasudras 
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became active in the campaign to partition Bengal in 1947, a campaign launched by 
the Hindu Mahasabha in 1946 and endorsed by the Congress after the Tarakeswar 
Convention in April 1947. This was part of a grassroots effort to ensure that the 
Namasudra heartlands were allotted to West Bengal and the Indian Union, during 
which they supported and became integrated within the wider nationalist movement 
and Hindu community. 
Coupled with the revised position of the Government of India, which had come to 
the view that Dalits simply constituted a part of the larger Hindu community during 
negotiations over the transfer of power, the changed conditions of the mid-1940s 
pushed Ambedkar towards reaching out to a number of other, more unlikely 
bedfellows. In a little known letter Ambedkar contacted W. E. B. Du Bois, the leading 
African American civil rights campaigner of this period, to ask his advice about how 
the National Negro Congress had gone about petitioning the United Nations.
76
 
Around the same time, he corresponded with Winston Churchill, the former prime 
minister, in an attempt to align the protection of Dalit interests with the premier 
opposition party within Britain at the time. Churchill responded favourably to 
AmbedkarÕs overtures, pledging that the Conservative Party would Ôprotect the future 
of 60 million Untouchables Òwhose melancholy depression by their co-religionists 
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constitutes one of the gravest features in the problems of the Indian subcontinentÓÕ.
77
 
The correspondence between the pair culminated in AmbedkarÕs visit to England in 
the autumn of 1946 to press the DalitsÕ cause. However, both of these initiatives 
ultimately failed to have the desired effect, and shortly thereafter Ambedkar 
performed what seemed to be an abrupt volte-face. 
Just over a month after his trip to England, Ambedkar made a remarkable speech in 
the Constituent Assembly, where he committed to the idea of Ôa United IndiaÕ and 
called upon the League to give up the demand for a separate Pakistan.
78
 AmbedkarÕs 
speech marked a major (albeit temporary) shift in his political career, bringing him 
much closer to the Congress at the very moment of IndiaÕs transition to independence. 
By August 1947, Ambedkar had been chosen as the Chair of the Constitution Drafting 
Committee and as the first Minister of Law and Justice in the new Indian 
governmentÕs cabinet. Scholars interested in Dalit politics during the transition to 
independence have proposed a number of different explanations for this relative 
dtente in the relationship between Ambedkar and the Congress, in which more recent 
works have emphasised the degree of political calculation that existed behind the new 
relationship on both sides.
79
 But all of these attempts to forge alternative alliances 
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emerged in the context of AmbedkarÕs concerns about Muslim majoritarianism within 
(an initially imagined) Pakistan. By September 1947, Ambedkar was calling upon 
Dalits residing in Pakistan to ÔreturnÕ to India: 
 
I would like to tell the Scheduled Castes who happen today to be impounded inside Pakistan 
to come over to India by such means as may be available to them. The second thing I want to 
say is that it would be fatal for the Scheduled Castes, whether in Pakistan or in Hyderabad, to 
put their faith in Muslims or the Muslim League. It has become a habit with the Scheduled 
Castes to look upon the Muslims as their friends simply because they dislike the Hindus. 
This is a mistaken view.
80
 
 
AmbedkarÕs new position on Pakistan was seemingly borne out by subsequent events. 
Over the next few years in Bengal, anti-Hindu violence and riots on the part of the 
Muslim majority was principally targeted at the Namasudra community that had 
remained behind. Representing the Namasudra as the ÔHindu OtherÕ collapsed the 
distinction between caste Hindus and Dalits and, when coupled with the violence, 
encouraged many to flee their homes and cross the border into India.
81
 By October 
1950, even Jogendranath Mandal, who had initially accepted a position in the 
Pakistani cabinet after independence, now decided to migrate to West Bengal, citing 
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the LeagueÕs broken promises to protect the Dalit minority community that had 
remained behind in East Pakistan. 
The perceived threat to minorities posed as a consequence of various forms of 
boundary redrawing was actually a frequent refrain in AmbedkarÕs thought during the 
gradual transition to democratic rule in South Asia, in which Pakistan figured as only 
one representation of a much wider demand for provincial autonomy. The call for the 
separation of Sind, for example, itself in part a precursor to the Pakistan demand, was 
not raised or debated in a vacuum. At the same time as Ambedkar was contesting this 
demand for separation, he was also raising concerns about the calls for the separation 
of Karnatak from Bombay.
82
 A decade later, in the context of pressure from an 
increasingly vociferous Samyukta Karnatak movement, the matter again became the 
subject of debate, albeit this time in the Bombay Legislative Assembly. Rising to 
respond to the resolution on KarnatakÕs creation, Ambedkar posed the possibility it 
engendered for the Ôdismemberment of minoritiesÕ in the provincial legislature: 
 
I cannot forget that in Karnatak we [Dalits] have only two seats. I am sure those members of 
the Scheduled Classes who come from the Karnatak must be feeling that their strength lies in 
the fact that there are 13 members from other parts of the Presidency to look after them? What 
is to happen to them?
83
 
 
Ambedkar went on to frame this concern about minority rights in the context of the 
threat posed by provincial majoritarianism. ÔI have my fearsÕ, he remarked, Ôthat if 
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Karnatak is created as a separate Province, it would be a Province of all the Lingayats 
against everybody elseÕ.
84
 Just as the prospect of partition raised the spectre of 
Muslim majoritarianism in an imagined Pakistan, linguistic reorganisation had the 
potential for similar repercussions in the context of both caste and language. By 1953, 
Ambedkar was again voicing similar concerns in the context of increasingly strident 
demands for the creation of Andhra, Karnataka and Maharashtra. In an article for the 
Times of India, Ambedkar noted that numerically preponderate non-Brahman castes, 
whether the Jats of Punjab, the Reddis, Kammas and Kapus of Andhra, or the 
Marathas of Maharashtra, normally dominated all political opportunities: ÔTake 
Andhra Ð there are two or three major communities spread over the linguistic area É 
They hold all the land, all the offices, all the business. The untouchables live in 
subordinate dependence on themÕ.
85
 He repeated this point in his Thoughts on 
linguistic states in 1955: ÔCastes are so distributed that in any given area there is one 
caste which is major and there are others which are small and are subservient to the 
major casteÕ. This, he suggested, owed much Ôto their comparative smallness and their 
economic dependence upon the major caste which owns most of the land in the 
villageÕ.
86
 As a result of this distribution of major and minor castes within any given 
area, linguistic reorganisation had potentially significant consequences for smaller 
communities, in which the dominant position of numerically preponderate castes 
would be both strengthened and perpetuated within the new province. Minorities, 
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meanwhile, were Ôsure to be discriminated against and denied equality before law and 
equal opportunity in public lifeÕ.
87
  
These tensions between majority and minority castes, or between non-Brahman and 
Dalit, had a longer history stretching back into the interwar period and emerging in 
the context of provincialisation. In rural Maharashtra, for example, attempts at Dalit 
political assertion had provoked antagonism between the majority Marathas and 
minority Mahars that played out at the local level in the context of their socio-
economic relations. During the late 1920s, as part of a larger attempt to ameliorate 
their impure and degraded status that had included the temple entry movements over 
access to civic space, many Dalits in western India had increasingly repudiated their 
ÔhereditaryÕ village tasks, such as the burying of dead cattle. In response, some 
villagers in the Ratnagiri District had warned, Ôthat unless they do continue to perform 
these duties they will prohibit them (the Mahars) from tending cattle and collecting 
grass in the lands held by them (the Marathas)Õ.
88
 Concerns at Dalit assertion also 
emerged in the reaction of non-Brahman politicians to the Poona Pact. In a note 
penned in October 1932, the Collector of Ahmadnagar noted that ÔOne or two 
Maratha leaders feared that Marathas though they formed the biggest community in 
the Deccan districts, are in danger of being converted into a minority in Council on 
account of the special weightage given to MinoritiesÕ.
89
 The impact of 
provincialisation, then, as a form of both democratisation and territorialisation, was to 
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give increased significance to number in provincial electoral equations. Within 
Marathi-speaking districts of Bombay, Ambedkar and the ILPÕs attempts to forge a 
coalition of the bahujan samaj in this context were frequently at odds with other 
majoritarian conceptions of democracy. In such understandings, reserved seats 
constituted Dalits as a distinct minority political constituency, which ate into the 
majoritarian interests of the Maratha (non-Brahman) community. 
Marathas increasingly looked to rely upon their demographic weight to capture 
political power, in a way that was to inform their demand for linguistic reorganisation 
of Bombay by the 1940s and 1950s. In fact, Ambedkar portrayed voting in elections 
to the provincial legislative assemblies as Ôalways communalÕ, in which Ô[t]he 
majority community carries the seat by sheer communal majorityÕ.
90
 Despite their 
secular pretensions, the Congress maintained this system by putting up candidates 
from castes which belonged to the majority community in any given constituency: ÔIt 
is by exploiting the caste system that the Congress winsÕ.
91
 As a result, Ambedkar 
came to describe the creation of a linguistic province as Ôthe handing over of Swaraj 
to a communal majority É Those who cannot understand this aspect of the problem 
would understand it better if instead of speaking in terms of linguistic State we spoke 
of a Jat State, a Reddy State or a Maratha StateÕ.
92
 Despite his continuing support for 
reorganisation, then, Ambedkar became increasingly concerned about its implications 
for Dalits in particular and various communal minorities more generally. 
Ambedkar also regularly framed his concerns about both linguistic reorganisation 
and Pakistan in the context of their implications for national unity and nation 
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building. In his earliest writings and speeches on reorganisation in the late 1920s, 
Ambedkar positioned himself as a nationalist critic of separation. In the context of the 
demands for Sind and Karnatak, he proclaimed ÔÉ the most vital need of the day is to 
create among the mass of the people the sense of a common nationality the feeling not 
that they are Indians first and Hindus, Mohamedans or Sindhis and Kanarese 
afterwards but that they are Indians first and Indians lastÕ.
93
 Likewise, in 1938, he 
described Samyukta Karnatak as running Ôdirectly counterÕ to the ideal that citizens 
Ôbe Indians first, Indians last and nothing else but IndiansÕ.
94
 Although AmbedkarÕs 
position on reorganisation changed during the 1940s, nationalism continued to be 
applied as a justificatory logic to support his views. Similarly, Ambedkar in part 
framed his initial support for the Pakistan demand during the early 1940s as informed 
by the dangers that keeping a recalcitrant and hostile Muslim nation within the Indian 
Union posed to ultimate national unity and effective democratic governance.
95
 
AmbedkarÕs uneasy alliance with the Congress came to an abrupt end in October 
1951, when he resigned from the Cabinet in protest at the dilution of the Hindu Code 
Bill in the interests of conservative caste Hindus. His decision to resign over the Bill 
reflected AmbedkarÕs wider frustrations with the Congress, and its continuing lack of 
sympathy for Dalit concerns.
96
 Yet despite the collapse of this relationship, Ambedkar 
continued to be convinced by the efficacy of Indian nationalism. Writing in Thoughts 
on linguistic states in 1955, Ambedkar reflected, 
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I am glad that India was separated from Pakistan. I was the philosopher, so to speak, of 
Pakistan. I advocated partition because I felt that it was only by partition that Hindus would 
not only be independent but free É A merely independent India would not have been a free 
India from the point of view of the Hindus. It would have been a Government of one country 
by two nations and of these two the Muslims without question would have been the ruling 
race É
97
 
In this telling the creation of Pakistan was the best solution to the communal question, 
for it allowed both Muslims and Hindus to govern themselves, whilst simultaneously 
reducing the demographic (and thus political) potency of a previously powerful and 
hostile minority community.
98
 Partition, then, was in the national interest. Before 
1947 this also raised the prospect of a potentially bright future for Ambedkar, in 
which caste and religious affinities would be politically inconsequential. Once the 
communal question was resolved, Ambedkar speculated, Ônothing can stand in the 
way of a party re-alignment, of the Congress and the Maha Sabha breaking up and of 
Hindus and Musalmans forming mixed political parties based on an agreed 
programme of social and economic regenerationÕ.
99
 Ambedkar here raised the 
prospect of democracy as non-discrimination in a future independent India, in which 
individual rights would take ultimate precedence over community affiliation. 
Ambedkar continued to broadly adhere to the principle of self-determination in the 
late 1940s and 1950s, particularly in the context of demands for provincial 
reorganisation. Equally, he continued to argue that such forms of reorganisation, like 
partition, produced Ôwhat democracy needsÕ, pointing out that a province that Ôis 
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homogeneous in its population can work for the true ends of democracy, for there are 
no artificial barriers or social antipathies which lead to the misuse of political 
powerÕ.
100
 Despite his coterminous concerns about provincial majoritarianism, then, 
Ambedkar here suggested that creating more homogenous provinces potentially paved 
the way for the replacement of communal majorities and minorities by political 
majorities and minorities. However, it was at this juncture that Ambedkar also began 
to express renewed concern about the potential impact of reorganisation upon national 
unity: ÔWhen the partition took place I felt that God was willing to lift his curse and 
let India be one, great and prosperous. But I fear that the curse may fall againÕ.
101
 . As 
Anupama Rao has written, ÔHaving embraced the political universalism of the 
Constitution É Ambedkar had little enthusiasm for a linguistic state based on 
equivalence among caste, region, and historyÕ.
102
 
In Maharashtra as a linguistic province, he again made reference to linguistic 
notions of nationality, but this time in a much more critical sense. He suggested that, 
unchecked, linguistic provinces might Ôresult in creating as many nations as there are 
groups with pride in their race, language and literature. The Central Legislature will 
be a League of Nations and the Central Executive may become a meeting of separate 
and solidified nations ÉÕ.
103
 This also had important implications for the everyday 
machinery of governance, whether in a legislative, judicial or administrative sense, 
posing significant questions about the ease of correspondence between the centre and 
the provinces if each province adopted a different language as their official language. 
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AmbedkarÕs solution was for each new province to embrace the language of the 
central government (English initially, and Hindi once ÔIndia becomes fit for this 
purposeÕ) as its official language, instead of the provincial alternative.
104
 This would 
not only make democratic governance more effective, he believed, but also prevent 
the further dismemberment of the Indian Union. 
AmbedkarÕs attempts to position himself as a nationalist critic of linguistic 
reorganisation, however, prompted regular accusations of hypocrisy from 
contemporary politicians and political commentators. In 1938, in the context of 
AmbedkarÕs intervention in the debate over Samyukta Karnataka, K. G. Gokhale 
rebuked Ambedkar for employing what he considered to be contradictory logic. 
Gokhale, a Brahman Congressman who had previously served as the Secretary of the 
Kannada Sahitya Sammelan and Harijan Sangha in Belgaum, made reference to 
AmbedkarÕs speech in the provincial legislative assembly to point out that, ÔÉ 
although Dr. Ambedkar said that he stood for nationalism first and nationalism last, 
he himself began by saying that he belonged to the Scheduled Classes and he 
demanded his rights as a member of the Scheduled ClassesÕ.
105
 Gokhale went on to 
suggest, in a somewhat pernicious manner, that, ÔIf Dr. Ambedkar has any faith in 
democracy and if democracy means rule of the majority, then minorities must 
honourably, whole-heartedly, sympathetically and heartily accept that particular 
ruleÕ.
106
 
	
104
 Ambedkar, Thoughts on linguistic states, p. 145; see also, Maharashtra as a linguistic province, 
pp. 104-105. 
105
 K. G. Gokhale (Belgaum South), ÔResolution re: creation of a separate Karnatak provinceÕ, BLA 
debates, p. 1726. 
106
 Ibid., p. 1728. 
	
46	
GokhaleÕs response to Ambedkar perfectly sums up the difficulties Ambedkar 
faced adopting both a coherent and potentially emancipatory position for Dalits in 
relation to various ideas about territorial reorganisation. Assuming a nationalist 
critique of both partition and linguistic provinces immediately raised questions for 
AmbedkarÕs own critics, particularly with regards to his own attempts to encourage a 
distinctive Dalit identity. But the second part of GokhaleÕs rejoinder is also indicative 
of the ways in which provincialisation and reorganisation, particularly when they 
were linked to broad understandings of nationality and Ôuniversal rightsÕ, could be 
considered as a harbinger of majoritarian democratic rule. Having increasingly 
recognised the futility of commensurative logic during this period, Ambedkar was 
now also forced to realise that his support for non-discrimination and universalism in 
general, and partition and reorganisation in particular, could also perpetuate 
alternative forms of democratic majoritarianism oriented around non-Brahman and 
Muslim rule in these provincial administrative spaces. Gokhale also considered 
AmbedkarÕs critique to be somewhat negligible: Dalits, as a minority, would have to 
accept the consequences of reorganisation as a feature of IndiaÕs greater 
democratisation after independence. In this sense, the insights that GokhaleÕs 
statement provides into the potential fallout from linguistic reorganisation parallels 
Anupama RaoÕs recognition that the demand for Pakistan demonstrated DalitsÕ 
unenviable position, Ôas a territorially dispersed minority with nowhere else to go; the 
impossibility, precisely, of converting minority into nationality at the critical moment 
of postcolonial transitionÕ.
107
 
 
Settlement, separation, and exchange of population 
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It was in light of concerns about both the failings of commensuration and the threat of 
majoritarianism, whether the latter was conceived as Hindu, Muslim, or Maratha, that 
Ambedkar and the AISCF contemplated another strategy to carve out an autonomous 
domain for Dalit politics. Mimicking the contemporary demands for Pakistan and 
Samyukta Maharashtra, they called for the establishment of separate settlements as a 
potential antidote, where Dalits might constitute a demographic majority themselves. 
Such calls for territorial separation were attempts to spatially inscribe the 
distinctiveness of DalitsÕ identity upon the landscape. At the same time, Ambedkar 
and the AISCF also looked to positively transform more longstanding spatial 
configurations that continued to play a major role in the perpetuation of caste 
inequality in rural India. ÔThe existing village systemÕ, Ambedkar asserted, Ôhas the 
effect of making the Scheduled Castes in the villages slaves of the Caste HindusÕ.
108
 
One of its defining features was the socio-spatial separation of untouchables from the 
rest of the village community: ÔThe Scheduled Castes are not allowed to live inside 
the village. They have to live on the outskirts. They are not allowed to take water 
from the village well. They are not allowed to send their children to the village 
schoolsÕ.
109
 Ambedkar, then, dwelt on the estrangement and isolation of Dalits from 
the heart of the village as one of the defining features of their social exclusion and as 
a major stumbling block to the removal of the stigma of untouchability. 
In his 1948 book, The untouchables: who were they and why they became 
untouchables?, Ambedkar narrated a history of Dalit social separation to explain their 
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contemporary circumstances. He linked the origins of untouchability to the story of 
the ÔBroken MenÕ, who were described by Ambedkar as the direct ancestors of Dalits, 
and who had ÔtraditionallyÕ performed the duties of village watchmen across rural 
India. According to Ambedkar, the ÔtribesÕ of the Broken Men had been defeated and 
routed by rivals in Ôprimitive timesÕ, and had been forced to live as Ôstray individualsÕ 
because they Ôcould not join another tribe and become a member of itÕ.
110
 Ambedkar 
described these Broken Men as agreeing to Ôdo the work of watch and wardÕ in return 
for Ôfood and shelterÕ from settled tribes.
111
 This was a mutual agreement that 
seemingly benefited both parties. But a difficulty arose in identifying where the 
Broken Men would live: only persons of the same tribe could live together, whilst the 
Broken Men were considered to be aliens. For Ambedkar, this clarified why they 
became ÔuntouchableÕ. Whilst in other societies (Ambedkar cited the work of Sir 
Henry Maine on Ireland, for example), Broken Men and settled villagers had become 
mixed and amalgamated over time, the Broken Men in India were kept outside and 
separate through the application of untouchability at a later date, as a consequence of 
which their peripheral-ness became Ôa perpetual and a permanent feature of the Indian 
villageÕ.
112
 As a result of this history, Ambedkar maintained that Dalits suffered not 
merely from Ôsocial separationÕ, but from Ôterritorial segregationÕ, which he described 
as a Ôcordon sanitaire putting the impure people inside a barbed wire into a sort of 
cageÕ.
113
 The physical space occupied by Dalits literally demarcated their social 
separation. 
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Before considering the AISCFÕs specific demands for separation in greater detail, it 
is worth noting that we can situate AmbedkarÕs thinking on this matter within a wider 
Dalit political milieu, not only in the context of an impending independence, but also 
stretching back into the interwar period. In the United Provinces, for example, a 
demand for ÔAchhutistanÕ (achhut being a less negative Hindi-language term for 
ÔuntouchableÕ) appeared in August 1941, drawing direct inspiration from the LeagueÕs 
Lahore Resolution, and demanding a separate territorial entity for Dalits Ôin a portion 
of IndiaÕ.
114
 This demand re-emerged in the Punjab after the formation of the All 
India Acchutistan Movement in November 1946, suggesting an achhut homeland be 
located in the Jullundur and Ambala divisions, and with a call for the government to 
fund the costs of relocation for Dalit communities from other parts of the province.
115
 
There was similar talk or calls for separate homelands amongst Dalit communities in 
northern Bengal and the Central Provinces at this time.
116
 
In the south, meanwhile, both the Madras Government and Cochin State had 
become involved in nascent schemes of Dalit resettlement, dating back to as early as 
the first decade of the twentieth century.
117
 By 1937-38, 417,794 acres of land had 
been provided specifically for Dalits in Madras, whilst 41 colonies had been 
established for Dalits on new land in Cochin. In western India, Ambedkar had also 
raised the possibility of securing separate land for Dalits as far back as 1926, and 
suggested potential plots in either Sind or Indore State in 1929.
118
 The Starte 
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Committee, appointed to provide recommendations for the amelioration of the 
condition of BombayÕs Ôdepressed classes and aboriginal tribesÕ (i.e. Dalits and 
Adivasis) in 1928, also raised the possibility of donation of land to Dalit communities. 
In its report of 1930, it suggested Ôthat some of the Depressed Classes would take up 
land in Sind if a suitable scheme could be worked out by the Barrage Revenue 
authorities in consultation with the Backward Classes officerÕ.
119
 It is significant that 
Ambedkar was himself one of the CommitteeÕs members, demonstrating how he had 
already began to contemplate the efficacy of such schemes in the context of 
provincialisation. But what this brief foray into the variety of demands and 
arrangements for DalitsÕ territorial separation throughout the twentieth century also 
demonstrates is that the AISCFÕs strategy was not just a novel, inadequately theorised 
scheme. In this telling, separation had already come to be perceived as a potential 
political opportunity for Dalits. This was particularly the case in a contemporary 
context in which other forms of territorial and administrative reorganisation were 
being contemplated and experienced, and which otherwise threatened to equally 
impinge upon Dalit political autonomy. 
In fact, Dalits constituted a minority (whether sizeable or not) of the electorate in 
any given constituency under the electoral arrangements introduced by the reforms of 
1919 and 1935. Even after the introduction of universal suffrage in an independent 
India, it was clear that they would almost always continue to be a minority as against 
the demographic weight of the caste Hindus. Of course, this minority status varied 
depending on the size of the Dalit community in any given part of the country. In 
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Uttar Pradesh today, for example, Dalits Ômake up the single largest social group 
among all communities and historically defined caste groups in the stateÕ, even if they 
still constitute a minority percentage of the total population.
120
 For Ambedkar, 
however, minority status ultimately meant that Ôthe Scheduled Castes cannot even 
exercise their right to vote for a candidate of their choice, if the Hindu villagers do not 
like himÕ.
121
 It was in this context, in an unpublished manuscript called ÔUntouchables 
or the children of IndiaÕs ghettoÕ, that Ambedkar took issue with the idealised 
portrayal of the village in both colonial and nationalist depictions of Indian society. 
He directed particular criticism towards Sir Charles MetcalfeÕs description of IndiaÕs 
village communities as Ôlittle republicsÕ. Ambedkar pointedly remarked, 
 
In this Republic, there is no place for democracy. There is no room for equality. There is no 
room for liberty and there is no room for fraternity. The Indian village is the very negation of a 
Republic. If it is a republic, it is a republic of the Touchables, by the Touchables and for the 
Touchables É The Untouchables have no rights É They have no rights because they are 
outside the village republic and because they are outside the so-called republic, they are 
outside the Hindu fold.
122
 
 
In this way, then, Ambedkar was able to connect ideas about the implementation of 
democracy in India with territory, noting how the location of Dalits on the peripheries 
of the village, in a literal as well as a metaphorical sense, meant that they were denied 
access to the same rights and privileges as caste Hindus. When combined with the 
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question of number, this posed an intractable problem: ÔAlthough the Untouchables 
number 50 millions, which appears in lump to be a formidable figure, in fact they are 
scattered all over the villages in India so that in each village they form a small 
minority pitted against a great majority of the caste HindusÕ.
123
 From 1942 onwards, 
therefore, Ambedkar made repeated references to the creation of separate settlements 
for Dalits, and even a single separate settlement known as ÔDalitstanÕ. Like the 
aforementioned call for Achhutistan, Dalitstan most obviously replicated, even in its 
appellation, the Muslim demand for Pakistan. On a theoretical level, Ambedkar 
justified this claim on the basis that Dalits were Ônot a sub-continent of the Hindus but 
a separate element in the national lifeÕ.
124
 However, critical to the practical validation 
of such claims in the context of the transfer of power was turning Dalits from a 
minority into a majority constituency. Ambedkar recognised as much when, in a 
candid interview with the British journalist and author Beverley Nichols, he explained 
the logic behind separate settlements: ÔIn every village there is a tiny minority of 
Untouchables. I want to gather those minorities together and make them into 
majoritiesÕ.
125
 In this scenario, then, Ambedkar acceded to and himself employed a 
definition of democracy that ultimately privileged forms of communal 
majoritarianism. 
During the same interview, Ambedkar also accepted that there remained a number 
of practical complexities that impacted upon the substance of the scheme, which 
would involve not only the transfer of huge numbers of people from their established 
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homes, but also the reallocation of vast tracts of land. Such spaces had to be both 
located and then suitably prepared for habitation, whilst funds for both relocation of 
people and allocation of land had to be found. Unlike Pakistan and Samyukta 
Maharashtra, which were predicated on the present status of Muslims and 
Marathas/Marathi speakers as majorities within existing administrative spaces, 
Dalitstan required the relocation and concentration of Dalits in an entirely new 
territorial entity. As a consequence of the practical difficulties associated with such a 
scheme, ultimately the idea did not long outlive PakistanÕs creation. Yet, whilst 
Dalitstan in the abstract was always somewhat intangible, underdeveloped and 
unsubstantiated, Ambedkar did begin to propose a number of supposedly practicable 
solutions to the AISCFÕs plan for (plural) separate settlements. In 1943 he argued, 
albeit still somewhat vaguely at this stage, that the government should meet the cost 
of Dalit resettlement.
126
 But in the aftermath of the Second World War and in the 
context of resumed talks over the transfer of power, Ambedkar and the AISCF 
accorded these ideas greater substance. In April 1946, for example, he told the Times 
of India Ôthat there were large areas of cultivable waste land lying untenanted in the 
country which could be set apart for the settlement of Scheduled Castes. Government 
could form a trust to give effect to the proposalÕ.
127
 A scheme for Dalit separation and 
resettlement was further fleshed out in the AISCFÕs memorandum to the Cabinet 
Mission earlier that same month. The AISCF proposed that a Settlement Commission 
be established to oversee the process of resettlement; that all cultivable and 
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unoccupied government land be handed over for that purpose; and that the 
Commission should be funded by the central government at a minimum rate of five 
crore (fifty million) rupees per annum, to fulfil a variety of duties including the 
purchase of Ônew land from private owners in fulfilment of the scheme of 
settlementÕ.
128
 
The AISCFÕs demand for recognition as a distinctive element within Indian society, 
of which both the calls for separate electorates and separate settlements were a part, 
was rejected by the Cabinet Mission in May 1946, which ultimately decided to 
recognise the Congress as representative of all IndiaÕs non-Muslim communities. But 
Ambedkar did not give up the demand for separate settlements entirely at this 
juncture. In this regard, we would perhaps do well to think a little more carefully 
about the continuing efficacy of such Dalit demands for territorial distinctiveness after 
the Cabinet Mission, particularly in the context of the events and implications of 
partition. In Delhi and Punjab, government officials in charge of refugee camps 
discriminated between caste Hindu and Dalit refugees from Pakistan.
129
 Meanwhile, 
the majority of poor Dalits arriving in West Bengal tended to be more reliant upon the 
state than those refugees drawn from amongst the bhadralok, and therefore were more 
likely to be dispersed to poorly equipped resettlement camps situated at a distance 
from urban centres.
130
 The West Bengal government justified their decision on the 
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basis that they simply did not have enough land to resettle the Namasudra 
agriculturalists, but the decision to disperse might be equally considered an attempt to 
deny the Dalit refugee a demographically concentrated political constituency in the 
environs of Calcutta. As a result of partition and their subsequent migration and 
displacement, then, Bandyopadhyay and Chaudhury argue that Dalits lost the 
geographical anchorage in eastern Bengal that had previously buttressed their 
movement. Accordingly, the Namasudras were pushed into strategic support for the 
Congress and left-leaning political parties led by non-Dalit actors, and ensured that 
they identified as part of a broader ÔrefugeeÕ movement, in which a separate Dalit 
political identity (and caste politics in postcolonial West Bengal more generally) came 
to be subsumed.
131
 
Whilst many poor refugees from East Bengal were dispersed to faraway camps and 
former wastelands, others Ôtended to cluster in agrarian, or semi-agrarian, tracts along 
the borders between the two BengalsÕ.
132
 They chose to settle in the districts because 
of kinship ties and networks, or in the context of communal rioting, in which 
displaced refugees who crossed the border drove Muslims out of these districts and 
occupied their homes.
133
 Most looked to scratch out a subsistence on smallholdings in 
the countryside. However, poor soil conditions meant many increasingly Ômoved to 
towns or semi-urban tracts in order to supplement their living from the soil with other 
sorts of workÕ.
134
 Undoubtedly, many of these refugee communities were drawn from 
caste Hindu communities. But it is worth noting that the Namasudras constituted the 
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largest proportion of the non-Muslim peasantry in East Bengal, who were now forced 
to migrate. Many of those who were able to avoid the ignominy of dispersal came to 
be heavily concentrated in such urban or semi-urban spaces. Ultimately, then, Dalits 
gradually became a significant political constituency as a consequence of their 
concentration in particular parts of the province, thereby realising aspects of 
AmbedkarÕs recognition of the significance of territorial clustering.
135
 This has also 
diminished their otherwise problematic reliance on reserved seats. Praskanva 
Sinharay has pointed to the contemporary electoral strength of the Namasudras by 
describing the successes of the Matua Mahasangha (an organisation representing the 
Matua religious sect, primarily followed by Dalits in Bangladesh and West Bengal) in 
the 2009 general elections. Particularly important here was the territorial 
concentration of Dalits in the Bagda, Bangaon, and Gaighata divisions of North 24 
Parganas district. This ensured all political parties had to adopt a ÔÒpolitics of 
compensationÓ vis--vis the Mahasangha by providing material gifts and promising 
administrative support to flatter the communityÕ.
136
 Accordingly, ÔIt was evident that 
because of the sheer organisational strength of the Mahasangha in terms of votes, the 
identity of being a Matua could now ÒtrumpÓ the identity of an Òillegal migrantÓÕ.
137
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We might also consider AmbedkarÕs scheme for Dalit resettlement in the context of 
his earlier imaginative thinking regarding partition. Pakistan, or the partition of India 
demonstrates that, unlike most prominent Congress and League politicians at the time, 
Ambedkar was already contemplating the possibility of the wholesale exchange of 
populations between India and Pakistan, from as early as 1945. Whilst Ambedkar 
recognised that partitioning Bengal and Punjab would potentially produce greater 
religious ÔhomogeneityÕ, there was still the tricky question of the minorities left on the 
wrong side of each border. In Sind and the North-West Frontier, for example, Ôthere 
are no districts in which the Hindus É are concentrated. They are scattered and are to 
be found in almost every district of the two provinces in small, insignificant numbers 
É There is only one remedy and that is to shift the populationÕ.
138
 Ambedkar went on 
to elaborate a scheme for the exchange of populations between India and Pakistan 
upon independence. Whilst he mistakenly assumed that there would be little 
migration within Punjab and Bengal, Ambedkar proposed that a scheme of Ôstate-
aided transferÕ should be instituted by both new states for a limited period of time, 
applying to Ôcertain well defined minorities who on account of ethnic or religious 
differences are sure to be subjected to discrimination or victimisationÕ.
139
 ÔThe 
machinery for effecting and facilitating the transfer of populationÕ was to be agreed 
upon in a treaty between India and Pakistan and paid for by both states, thereby 
ensuring that minorities were able to move Ôwithout impediment and without lossÕ.
140
 
Equally, he proposed that migrating families should be reimbursed by the state for the 
loss of immovable property. Ambedkar also recognised that many would choose to 
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stay on, using this to justify his belief that the scheme should be voluntary rather than 
compulsory: ÔMen love property more than liberty. Many will prefer to endure 
tyranny at the hands of their political masters than change the habitat in which they 
are rootedÕ.
141
 In proposing this scheme, then, Ambedkar sought to prove that 
resettlement, separation, and the exchange of populations, rather than being the 
ÔstaggeringÕ and Ôbaffling problemÕ suggested by its critics, was ultimately both 
possible and achievable.
142
 
Separate settlements continued to appear on the Dalit political agenda in the years 
after 1947. In their election manifesto of 1951, for example, the AISCF continued to 
promise to Ôreserve land out of uncultivated land or reclaimed land for the benefit of 
landless labourersÕ.
143
 In the context of linguistic reorganisation, AmbedkarÕs idea of 
separate settlements took on a somewhat altered form, but its territorial and 
demographic premises remained the same. In 1948, Ambedkar was in favour of 
creating a unitary province of Maharashtra that was capable of containing all Marathi 
speakers.
144
 But by 1955, after becoming increasingly disillusioned with the kind of 
ÔPact politicsÕ described earlier in this article, and conscious of the threat posed by the 
rising tide of Maratha majoritarianism, he had changed his mind. Ambedkar now 
argued that linguistic reorganisation could Ôalso mean that people speaking one 
language may be grouped under many States provided each State has under its 
jurisdiction people who are speaking one languageÕ.
145
 Accordingly, Ambedkar 
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fashioned a new plan for reorganisation in western India, whereby Marathi-speaking 
areas would be constituted into four new provinces: Maharashtra City State 
(Bombay); Western Maharashtra; Central Maharashtra; and Eastern Maharashtra. On 
the one hand, Ambedkar believed this would go some way towards ameliorating the 
economic inequalities that existed between the regions, in which each proposed 
province would be best placed to look after its own interests. If grouped together in a 
unitary province, Ambedkar claimed it was unlikely that the wealthier regions of 
Western and Eastern Maharashtra would be interested in the development of Central 
Maharashtra.
146
 But the scheme also shared many similar characteristics to the 
demand for separate settlements for Dalits that had emerged a decade earlier. Creating 
four provinces, rather than one, was a tactic to counter the otherwise demographically 
negligible position of Dalits within an imagined Maharashtra: ÔAs the area of the State 
increases the proportion of the minority to the majority decreases É and the 
opportunities for the majority to practice tyranny over the minority becomes greater. 
The States must therefore be smallÕ.
147
 The division of a unitary Maharashtra was also 
premised on AmbedkarÕs idea that Bombay City would serve as a sanctuary for 
Dalits, because no community formed an outright majority in the city (Marathi 
speakers constituted around 48 per cent of the cityÕs population at this time): 
 
The minorities and the Scheduled Castes who are living in the village are constantly subjected 
to tyranny, oppression, and even murders by the members of the majority communities. The 
minorities need an asylum, a place of refuge where they can be free from the tyranny of the 
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majority. If there was a United Maharashtra with Bombay included in it where can they go for 
safety?
148
 
 
AmbedkarÕs proposal therefore drew upon both an idealised image of the 
emancipatory potential of migration to the metropolis, and his aforementioned 
critique of the village. Both of these ideas had been central to the wider Dalit 
imagination since the nineteenth century.
149
 The idea of separate settlements also 
outlasted AmbedkarÕs death, appearing in the call for the allocation of wastelands to 
landless labourers in the charter of demands presented to the government by the 
Republican Party of India (the successor organisation to the AISCF) in 1964.
150
 
Rather than treating AmbedkarÕs demands for separate settlements and sites of 
sanctuary as hastily assembled and somewhat unsophisticated, or as simply a poor 
manÕs version of Pakistan, we might interpret them to be relatively refined attempts to 
solve the democratic conundrum that defined Dalit politics during this period. On the 
one hand, reserved seats, as a form of democratic commensuration, simply 
perpetuated DalitsÕ minority status and the political dominance of the caste Hindu 
majority. Under the terms of the Poona Pact, it was unlikely that Dalit politicians 
elected to office by a caste Hindu majority in any given constituency would be truly 
representative of wider Dalit opinion. On the other, an attempted alliance with other 
subjugated communities, along the lines of a Dalit-Muslim-Non-Brahman axis that 
was capable of potentially constituting a political majority, had collapsed in acrimony 
as Muslims and Marathas claimed majority status within rearranged 
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provincial/national political arenas. Separate settlements theoretically provided one 
means to overcome this impasse, providing spaces where Dalits could constitute a 
majority of the population themselves. Although this would be incapable of ultimately 
challenging caste Hindu majoritarianism at the centre, or even in the provincial arena, 
it potentially provided localised spaces, or constituencies, where Dalits could either be 
elevated into positions of power or emerge as the beneficiaries of a Ôpolitics of 
compensationÕ as a result of their sheer numbers. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Although Dalit demands for reallocation of wastelands continue to be occasionally 
articulated, the separate settlements imagined for Dalits by Ambedkar and the AISCF 
have yet to be comprehensively created. However, considering the reasons that lay 
behind the emergence of this demand in the context of the postcolonial transition has 
provided us with new insights into Dalit politics during this period. Rethinking space 
by redrawing administrative territory initially offered Ambedkar one potential 
pathway out of the Poona Pact impasse in which commensurative practices had 
become mired. AmbedkarÕs attempts to forge coalitions with other disadvantaged 
communities, which were capable of challenging Congress and high-caste Hindu 
dominance, emerged in this context. Yet, despite offering his support to both Pakistan 
and linguistic reorganisation at various historical junctures, Ambedkar was always 
somewhat ambivalent about their consequences. Whilst both could be considered as 
possible harbingers of greater democratic governance, Ambedkar believed they also 
increasingly raised the prospect of provincial forms of majoritarianism. The collapse 
of coalition making was a consequence of this shift in emphasis, away from 
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countrywide minority to provincial majority, and from community to nation, amongst 
some Muslim and non-Brahman representatives. In these circumstances, the demand 
for separate Dalit settlements can be perceived as a response to the failures of both 
commensuration and coalition in the context of provincialisation. In fact, they 
demonstrate an attempt by Ambedkar to employ a similar definition of democracy to 
that emphasised in the demands for Pakistan and Samyukta Maharashtra, based 
around a form of communal majoritarianism at an alternative scale and in an 
unconventional space. 
Ambedkar recognised patterns of both closure and opportunity at the provincial 
level in late colonial India, as a consequence of the impact of ÔprovincialisationÕ. 
Provincialisation here might serve as shorthand to describe the dual processes of 
democratisation and territorialisation that occurred in interwar India, which mapped 
onto prevailing notions of the efficacy of community within Indian politics and 
society, and which provided fertile ground for the demands for Pakistan and linguistic 
reorganisation in subsequent decades. Focusing on provincialisation has provided not 
only a new site through which to examine the impact of territorial configurations upon 
Dalits, but also effectively historicises the relationship between provincial 
reorganisation and caste considered in the works of some contemporary political and 
social scientists. At the same time, the focus on provincialisation also allows us to 
think about the similar historical antecedents and processes that existed behind the 
emergence of majoritarian demands for Pakistan and linguistic reorganisation, as well 
as their impact on caste politics. Ambedkar most certainly responded to both the 
Pakistan demand and the call for Samyukta Maharashtra in an analogous manner: he 
initially expressed his support for what he supposed to be demands for greater 
democratisation, which promised to diminish the power of the high-caste Hindu in the 
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context of pact politics and coalition making; he went on to hedge this support with 
certain qualifications to protect minority interests; and he ultimately became 
increasingly concerned about the implications of both these demands for Dalit 
autonomy, to the extent that he sought alternative strategies of separation. 
Finally, emphasising the manner in which territory mediates processes of 
democratisation also has wider implications beyond this articleÕs South Asian setting. 
Ambedkar himself was aware of such parallels, and compared his proposals on 
separate settlements for Dalits with proto-apartheid measures that had been provided 
under the South African Native Trust and Land Act of 1936. In this partial telling, and 
before the full horrors of the apartheid regime had become evident to Ambedkar, the 
allocation of territory to black Africans or ÔBantusÕ was described positively, as 
safeguarding ÔBantuÕ interests through such separate administrative zones.
151
 
Interestingly, this paralleled a simultaneous move by apartheid apologists to describe 
the scheme as ÔBantustanÕ, borrowing from the terminology of the contemporary 
Pakistan demand in an attempt to provide it with progressive connotations, despite the 
racial discrimination and forcible relocations that actually underpinned it.
152
 At other 
times, Ambedkar and his contemporaries were to compare the socio-spatial 
segregation of Dalits with the experiences of the African-American and Jewish 
ghettos.
153
 In Pakistan, or the partition of India, meanwhile, Ambedkar also 
referenced the 1923 agreement on population exchange between Greece and Turkey 
to resolve the Ôminority problemÕ as a paradigm for India and Pakistan: ÔExperience 
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showed that safeguards did not save the minorities É the best way to solve it was for 
each to exchange its alien minorities within its border, for its own which was without 
its border, with a view to bring about homogeneous StatesÕ.
154
 He dedicated an entire 
chapter of the book to Ôthe fate that has befallen other countries which, like India, 
harboured many nations and sought to harmonise themÕ, drawing upon the collapse of 
the Ottoman Empire and Czechoslovakia as examples to illustrate this point.
155
  
We can therefore place AmbedkarÕs attempts to reorganise territories and 
populations within a wider global logic of the early to mid-twentieth century, which 
emerged in the context of conflicts between communities within Ômulti-nationalÕ 
spaces over the substance of democracy. The Armenian and Nazi genocides are the 
most obvious examples of the problems engendered by democratic majoritarianism, in 
which movements designed to represent Ôthe interests of the peopleÕ deliberately 
targeted, excluded and murdered minorities who did not cohere with their 
understanding of the ethnic nation. Yet, as both Ambedkar and, more recently, 
Michael Mann have pointed out, Ô[c]leansing by emigration was then officially 
ratified by the 1918 Peace TreatiesÕ, during which states were allocated to dominant 
ethnic groups.
156
 Across the world, we continue to live under a dominant political 
system of liberal democracy, which, in the early twentieth century, Ômade sacred a 
majoritarian and territorial form of sovereigntyÕ.
157
 Provincialisation in India, as a 
form of both territorialisation and democratisation, encouraged similar developments, 
in which political legitimacy was vested in the majority of Ôthe peopleÕ Ð whether 
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understood on the basis of caste, language, or religion Ð at the expense of minority 
ÔothersÕ. Indeed, AmbedkarÕs schemes for resettlement might be seen as a milder 
form of cleansing, whether in the context of partition, linguistic reorganisation, or 
Dalit resettlement. Although justified to avoid a repeat of the situation in Europe, both 
the tragedy of partition and the continuing socio-spatial discrimination experienced by 
Dalits means that such schemes have most often succumbed to much of the same 
undesirable logic. 
